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Abstract
Significant controversy remains about what constitute correct self-
locating beliefs in scenarios such as the Sleeping Beauty problem, with
proponents on both the “halfer” and “thirder” sides. To attempt to set-
tle the issue, one natural approach consists in creating decision variants
of the problem, determining what actions the various candidate beliefs
prescribe, and assessing whether these actions are reasonable when we
step back. Dutch book arguments are a special case of this approach, but
other Sleeping Beauty games have also been constructed to make similar
points. Building on a recent article (James R. Shaw. De se belief and ra-
tional choice. Synthese, 190(3):491-508, 2013), I show that in general we
should be wary of such arguments, because unintuitive actions may result
for reasons that are unrelated to the beliefs. On the other hand, I show
that, when we restrict our attention to additive games, then a thirder will
necessarily maximize her ex ante expected payout, but a halfer in some
cases will not (assuming causal decision theory). I conclude that this does
not necessarily settle the issue and speculate about what might.
Keywords: Sleeping Beauty, Dutch books, decision theory, game theory.
1 Introduction
The Sleeping Beauty problem [Elga, 2000] illustrates some fundamental issues
regarding self-locating beliefs. In it, a study participant referred to as “Sleeping
Beauty” is put to sleep on Sunday, and awoken either just on Monday, or on
both Monday and Tuesday, according to the outcome of a fair coin toss (Heads
or Tails, respectively). After an awakening, she is put back to sleep with her
memory of the awakening event erased, so that all awakenings are indistinguish-
able to her. When Beauty is awoken, what should be her credence (subjective
probability) that the coin came up Heads? Some (“halfers”) argue that it should
be 1/2. The standard argument for this position is that this should have been
her credence in Heads before the experiment, and she has learned nothing new,
∗This paper appears in Synthese, Volume 192, Issue 12, pp. 4107-4119, December 2015.
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0737-x
1
knowing all along that she would be awoken at least once. Others (“thirders”)
argue that it should be 1/3. The standard argument for this position is that if
the experiment is repeated many times, in the long run, only 1/3 of awakenings
correspond to a toss of Heads. (It should be emphasized that “halfers” and
“thirders” would compute other fractions on different examples, and “halfing”
and “thirding” are supposed to refer to the methods of computing these fractions
rather than these specific values.) For a summary of reasons why philosophers
are interested in the Sleeping Beauty problem, see Titelbaum [2013].
One approach to settling what Beauty ought to believe is to design scenarios
where she must act on her beliefs, and to investigate the consequences of being
a thirder or a halfer on these actions. One specific line of attack within this
general approach is to design Dutch book arguments. A Dutch book is a set of
bets that an agent would all adopt individually in spite of the fact that their
combination will lead to a guaranteed loss. If such can be constructed, this
is an argument against the rationality of the agent’s beliefs. In the context of
the Sleeping Beauty problem, the focus is on diachronic Dutch books, which
involve bets at different times. Dutch book arguments for the Sleeping Beauty
problem are considered by Hitchcock [2004], Halpern [2006], Draper and Pust
[2008], Briggs [2010], and Conitzer [2015]. These arguments generally favor
thirding, though it is sometimes also argued that a halfer can resist Dutch
books, particularly when adopting evidential decision theory. Shaw [2013] more
generally pursues the agenda of integrating de se beliefs with rational choice in
the context of variants of the Sleeping Beauty problem. He allows Beauty to
play more complex games, and designs one where, he argues, the thirder makes
the wrong decision and the halfer makes the right decision, regardless of whether
they adopt causal or evidential decision theory.
In this article, taking Shaw [2013] as a starting point, I further pursue the
agenda of settling the correct answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem by look-
ing at the consequences of halfing and thirding on the outcomes of associated
decision problems. I first sound a note of caution by showing that in some cases
unintuitive outcomes in these examples result not from incorrect credences, but
rather from challenges that a rational actor faces when trying to coordinate
with her past and future selves under imperfect recall (at least under causal
decision theory). From examples that involve such challenges, we cannot com-
fortably draw any conclusions about the (in)correctness of a particular approach
for computing credences. Subsequently, I show that if we restrict the types of
decision problem to additive ones, which include typical Dutch book arguments,
these coordination challenges disappear; moreover, under causal decision theory,
a thirder will always make decisions that maximize her overall expected payout,
but a halfer in some cases does not. I conclude by assessing how much we can
learn from these results about correct self-locating beliefs.
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2 Review: Shaw’s Waking Game
First, a review of Shaw’s Waking Game is in order. He argues that thirders get
the wrong answer in this game while halfers get it right. I focus here on his
analysis of a thirder who is a causal decision theorist.1
Shaw’s Waking Game. At the beginning of the experiment, Beauty is
informed of the rules of the game, which are as follows. A fair coin will be tossed;
the outcome of this coin toss will not be revealed to Beauty until the game is
over. If it lands Heads, she will be woken up only once, on Monday. If it lands
Tails, she will be woken up four times, on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and
Thursday. Each day, she will be asked to press either Left of Right. Her memory
of the awakening will be erased afterwards, she will not be able to take any
notes, and the awakenings will be indistinguishable. She will be compensated
as follows.
1. If Heads came up and she pressed Left, she will receive $400.
2. If Heads came up and she pressed Right, she will receive $200.
3. If Tails came up and she pressed Left on each of the four days, she will
receive $100.
4. If Tails came up and she pressed Right on each of the four days, she will
receive $200.
5. If Tails came up and she pressed Left on Monday and Right on at least
one other day, she will receive $200.
6. If Tails came up and she pressed Right on Monday and Left on at least
one other day, she will receive $100.
Shaw makes two assumptions that he calls Randomizing Prohibited and Pre-
vious Runs. The meaning of the former is clear; the latter refers to the fact
that Beauty, having seen many similar experiments performed on others, has
become convinced that a subject always makes the same decision on each of
her awakenings. These imply the following, which is all that is needed for his
analysis of the case of a thirder who is a causal decision theorist.
Definition 1 Beauty is said to accept Consistency in Other Rounds if, upon
any given awakening, she does not assign any credence to the following event:
she has woken up or will wake up (with the same information) multiple addi-
tional times and did not/will not take the same action on each of those other
occasions.
1Throughout, unless otherwise noted, I will focus on causal decision theory. Therefore,
some of the conclusions I reach can be avoided by dismissing causal decision theory. If the
reader feels compelled to do so by the examples provided here, then that might be an even
more significant impact for them to have—but I myself am not willing to go that far.
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Then, Shaw provides the following analysis. If Beauty is a thirder and a
causal decision theorist, then upon an awakening, she should assign 1/5 credence
to Heads/Monday, 1/5 to Tails/Monday, and 3/5 to Tails/some other day. If
she accepts Consistency in Other Rounds, then moreover she believes that either
(a) on all other awakenings (if any) she chooses Left, or that (b) on all other
awakenings she chooses Right. Under (a), if she chooses to now press Left, her
expected payout will be
(1/5) · $400 + (1/5) · $100 + (3/5) · $100 = $160
On the other hand, if she chooses to now press Right, her expected payout will
be
(1/5) · $200 + (1/5) · $100 + (3/5) · $200 = $180
Hence, under (a), she is better off pressing Right.
Under (b), if she chooses to now press Left, her expected payout will be
(1/5) · $400 + (1/5) · $200 + (3/5) · $100 = $180
On the other hand, if she chooses to now press Right, her expected payout will
be
(1/5) · $200 + (1/5) · $200 + (3/5) · $200 = $200
Hence, under (b), she is also better off pressing Right! It follows that Beauty,
if she is a thirder and a causal decision theorist, will press Right.
Now, because all awakenings are indistinguishable, she should always press
Right, resulting in a payout of $200. But always pressing Left would have
resulted in an expected value of $250, which is better (assuming Beauty is risk-
neutral), and is hence the correct course of action according to Shaw. (He shows
that a thirder who is an evidential decision theorist also should choose Right in
this example, but I will not review this analysis here.)
3 Three Awakenings
Shaw’s Waking Game is illuminating, but I believe little can be concluded from
it about whether thirding or halfing is correct. To show why, let us consider
another example that shares key features of the reasoning above, but without
any coin tosses whatsoever.
Three awakenings. At the beginning of the experiment, Beauty is in-
formed of the rules of the game, which are as follows. She will be woken up
exactly three times (Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday). Each day, she will be
asked to press either Left of Right. Her memory of the awakening will be erased
afterwards, she will not be able to take any notes, and the awakenings will be
indistinguishable. She will be compensated as follows.
1. If she never pressed Right, she will receive $200.
2. If she pressed Right once, she will receive $300.
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3. If she pressed Right twice, she will receive $0.
4. If she pressed Right three times, she will receive $100.
Again, note that no coins are tossed at all in Three Awakenings.2 The only
uncertainties that Beauty faces are (1) which day it is and (2) what she herself
has done and will do on the other days. In fact, arguably, (1) does not even
matter because in this game, all awakenings are treated symmetrically. The key
uncertainty is (2).
How should Beauty act in this game? If she always presses Left, she will
obtain $200; if she always presses Right, she will obtain only $100. So something
is to be said for pressing Left. However, upon any given awakening, Beauty can
reason as follows. There are two other rounds in which she has pressed or will
press a button. If she accepts Consistency in Other Rounds, then she believes
that either (a) she has pressed or will press Left both other times or (b) she has
pressed or will press Right both other times. In case (a), she will be better off
pressing Right this round, because pressing Right in only one round pays out
$300, whereas never pressing Right pays out $200. In case (b), she will also be
better off pressing Right this round, because pressing Right in all three rounds
pays out $100, whereas pressing Right in only two pays out nothing. So in either
case Beauty is better off pressing Right, gaining $100 from doing so!3 Then,
because all awakenings are indistinguishable, it seems we should expect Beauty
to press Right all the time—even though pressing Left all the time results in a
higher payout.
From Three Awakenings, it becomes clear that, under causal decision the-
ory, actions that are locally optimal—at least when assuming Consistency in
Other Rounds—can result in globally suboptimal outcomes, even in cases where
there is no ambiguity about what the correct credences are. (I take it to be
uncontroversial that Beauty’s credence upon awakening should be distributed
uniformly (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) across Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday.) I believe
the example also makes it clear that the total payout earned by a subject is a
very unreliable indicator of the correctness of her credences.4 To drive home
the point, consider the following modification of Three Awakenings.
Three Awakenings with a Coin Toss. The experiment now begins with a
biased coin toss. If it lands Heads (which happens 99% of the time), we proceed
with the original Three Awakenings game. If it lands Tails (1%), Beauty will
2In this sense, it is closer to the example of O’Leary awakening twice in his trunk [Stalnaker,
1981], except that I need three rather than two awakenings. Nevertheless, I will stick with
the Beauty terminology for expository purposes, and will reintroduce coin tosses soon.
3Of course, to reason this way, Beauty must be a causal decision theorist; if she were an
evidential decision theorist, then she would prefer to press Left and therefore believe that she
presses Left in the other rounds as well. The example may thus provide some ammunition
for evidential decision theorists, but again, I will attempt to steer clear of that debate here as
much as possible.
4One might, of course, argue that this is so only because we are using causal decision theory
and causal decision theory is flawed. Still, given the prominence of causal decision theory, I
believe the example should leave us generally cautious about the strategy of using rational
choice to determine what the correct credences are.
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similarly be woken up on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, and asked to press
Left or Right, but the payoffs will be different. In fact, they will be much
simpler: she will receive $100 for each time she presses Left (and nothing for
pressing Right). As always, Beauty knows the setup of this modified game, but
will not receive any evidence of how the coin landed until the game has ended.
I take it to be uncontroversial that upon any awakening, Beauty should place
a credence of 99% on the event that the coin landed Heads, because whether
the coin landed Heads or not, she will be awoken three times. Moreover, in all
six possible awakening events, she will have the exact same information. Given
this, the modification is too slight to have an impact on her decision: for any
given awakening, there is a 99% chance that she will gain $100 from pressing
Right (assuming Consistency in Other Rounds) and a 1% chance that she will
lose $100 from doing so—so she should still press Right. But now, suppose that
Beauty’s credence is inexplicably inverted, so that she believes that there is a
99% chance that the coin came up Tails. If so, then from her perspective, now
the simpler payoff function dominates and clearly she should press Left. As a
result, she will actually obtain a larger expected payout from the actual game,
because always pressing Left results in a higher payout in Three Awakenings
than always pressing Right. However, it seems clear that this should not lead
us to believe that Beauty’s inverted credence is in any sense correct; rather, she
was just lucky that she accidentally inverted the credences, thereby escaping the
detrimental reasoning to which understanding the game correctly would have
led her.
Of course, we do not need to go to such lengths to find examples where in-
correct credences lead to a better result. Someone who for some reason believes
that in roulette Red comes up 2/3 of the time, and bets on Red once for this
reason only (as opposed to not betting at all), may well get lucky on that one
spin of the wheel. If so, nobody will argue that this ex post outcome implies that
the credence of 2/3 was correct. What is interesting about Three Awakenings
with a Coin Toss is that any credences that maximize ex ante expected payoff
are clearly incorrect. It would seem that it is a very reasonable criterion for
evaluating the correctness of credences to see whether they lead to the max-
imum ex ante expected payoff—but the example shows that this approach is,
in general, problematic (at least if we are not willing to dismiss causal decision
theory).
4 Additive Games
The examples in Section 3 suggest that in sufficiently rich decision variants of the
Sleeping Beauty problem, under causal decision theory, the payouts that Beauty
obtains do not provide useful guidance for what her correct credences should
be. This is so because in such scenarios, actions that are locally apparently
rational may lead to suboptimal payouts even when there can be no serious
dispute about what the correct credences should be. But perhaps, if we restrict
the space of scenarios, we can avoid such issues.
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The problematic aspect of the Three Awakenings game is that Beauty’s
“three selves” need to coordinate their actions to maximize payout—the effect
of one action on overall payout depends on the other actions—and they fail
to do so due to the lack of memory. What happens if we assume away this
interdependence? In what follows, I show that in the resulting restricted class
of games—additive games—Beauty does in fact maximize her expected total
payout by being a thirder (and a causal decision theorist). Of course, merely
showing an example additive game where being a thirder maximizes Beauty’s
expected total payout will do little to prove the point, because for all we know
there is another example where being a thirder results in suboptimal payout. I
have to prove the result at some level of generality for it to be more than merely
suggestive. In particular, for the sake of generality, I wish to allow that Beauty
does not necessarily have the same experience in each awakening (thereby al-
lowing us to also address examples such as “Technicolor Beauty” [Titelbaum,
2008]). To do so, I will have to be a bit more formal.
Definition 2 A Sleeping Beauty decision variant with payoff function pi is ad-
ditive if for every realization r of the initial coin toss,5
• (actions do not affect future rounds) r always leads to the same
number nr of awakenings by Beauty regardless of Beauty’s actions, and
for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ nr, the information that Beauty possesses in
the ith awakening depends only on r and i, and not on Beauty’s earlier
actions; and
• (payoff additivity) for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ nr, and every two corre-
sponding sequences of actions a1, . . . , anr and a
′
1, . . . , a
′
nr
that Beauty may
take upon her nr awakenings, we have that
pi(r, a1, . . . , anr)− pi(r, a1, . . . , ai−1, a
′
i, ai+1, . . . anr ) =
pi(r, a′1, . . . , a
′
i−1, ai, a
′
i+1, . . . a
′
nr
)− pi(r, a′1, . . . , a
′
nr
)
Intuitively, in additive games, Beauty does not need to worry about coordi-
nating her actions with her selves from other awakenings. This is because by
the first condition, the only effect of actions is directly on the final payout (as
opposed to them affecting the number of awakenings or the information that she
has in future rounds), and by the second condition these effects on payout are
independent across actions. This intuition leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If Beauty is a thirder and a causal decision theorist, and acts
accordingly upon each individual awakening, then she will maximize her ex ante
expected payout in additive games. If she is a halfer and a causal decision
5We may assume without loss of generality that a single coin toss at the beginning provides
all the randomness needed for the duration of the game, since we can keep as much of this
randomness hidden from Beauty as we must, for as long as we must. Indeed, it is commonly
agreed that moving the coin toss between Sunday night and Monday night in the standard
version of the Sleeping Beauty problem makes no difference.
7
theorist, and acts accordingly on each individual awakening, there are additive
games in which she does not maximize her ex ante expected payout.
Proof. For each r and i with 1 ≤ i ≤ nr, let v(r, i) correspond to the
awakening event on the ith day after a coin toss realization of r. Let V =⋃
(r,i):1≤i≤nr
{v(r, i)} be the set of all awakening events. By payoff additiv-
ity, we can construct, for every v ∈ V , a function piv such that Beauty’s
total payout upon coin toss realization r and actions a1, . . . , anr is c(r) +∑
i∈{1,...,nr}
piv(r,i)(ai), where c(r) is a constant that we may ignore for the pur-
pose of acting optimally.6 We will use I ⊆ V to denote an information set, i.e., a
set of awakening events that Beauty cannot distinguish.7 Note that two awak-
ening events in the same information set may correspond either to the same
coin toss realization r—e.g., subsequent Monday and Tuesday awakenings in
the standard version of Sleeping Beauty—or to different coin toss realizations—
e.g., the two Monday awakening events corresponding to Heads and Tails in
the standard version. When Beauty awakens in information set I, if she is a
thirder, then her credence that the realization of the coin toss is r is given by
P (r|I) = P (r)·ν(I,r)∑
r′
P (r′)·ν(I,r′) , where ν(I, r) = |{v ∈ I : r(v) = r}| is the number of
times that Beauty will awaken with information I after coin toss realization r
and r(v) is the realization that leads to v. (This is the essence of being a thirder:
given particular information upon awakening, credence in a particular realiza-
tion is proportional to the number of times one will awaken with this information
under this realization. Indeed, if the experiment is repeated many times, then
P (r|I) gives the long-run fraction of the awakenings in information set I that
corresponded to a coin toss realization of r.) Moreover, the credence that she
assigns to a specific v ∈ I with r(v) = r is P (v|I) = P (r|I)
ν(I,r) =
P (r)∑
r′
P (r′)·ν(I,r′) .
Hence, if AI is the set of actions available to her in information set I,
8 she will
choose some aI ∈ AI that maximizes
∑
v∈I P (v|I)piv(aI).
If Beauty takes action aI ∈ AI whenever she is in information set I, then her
ex ante expected payout overall is
∑
r P (r)
∑
i∈{1,...,nr}
piv(r,i)(aI(v(r,i))) (where
I(v) is the information set in which v lies). Rearranging, this is equal to
6To be specific, we can choose, for every v, a default action dv. Let r(v) de-
note the coin toss realization that leads to v. Then, for any action av that can
be taken at v, we let piv(av) = pi(r(v), dv(r,1), . . . , dv(r,i−1), av , dv(r,i+1), . . . , dv(r,nr)) −
pi(r(v), dv(r,1), . . . , dv(r,i−1), dv , dv(r,i+1), . . . , dv(r,nr)), where v = v(r, i). By payoff ad-
ditivity it then follows that pi(r, a1, . . . , anr ) = piv(r,1)(a1) + pi(r, dv(r,1), a2, . . . , anr ) =
piv(r,1)(a1)+piv(r,2)(a2)+pi(r, dv(r,1), dv(r,2), a3, . . . , anr ) = . . . = (
∑
i∈{1,...,nr}
piv(r,i)(ai))+
pi(r(v), dv(r,1), . . . , dv(r,nr)), so we can set c(r) = pi(r(v), dv(r,1), . . . , dv(r,nr)). (It is easy to
see that conversely the existence of such piv(·) implies payoff additivity.)
7Note that one awakening event corresponds to many nodes in the standard extensive-form
representation of the game—one for each sequence of actions that Beauty has taken so far.
However, because of the “actions do not affect future rounds” condition, all these nodes must
lie in the same information set.
8Note that an agent cannot have different sets of actions available to her in two awakening
events that are in the same information set, because then she would be able to rule out some
of the awakening events in the information set based on the actions available to her. Some
Dutch book arguments are flawed because they violate this criterion.
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∑
I
∑
v∈I P (r(v))piv(aI).
9 We will show that if Beauty is a thirder and a causal
decision theorist, then in fact for every I she maximizes
∑
v∈I P (r(v))piv(aI),
thereby establishing that she maximizes her ex ante expected payout over-
all. Indeed, we have already established that for each I, Beauty maximizes
∑
v∈I P (v|I)piv(aI). Using that (Beauty being a thirder) P (v|I) =
P (r(v))∑
r′
P (r′)·ν(I,r′) ,
we obtain that Beauty maximizes
∑
v∈I
P (r(v))piv(aI)∑
r′
P (r′)·ν(I,r′) . Because Beauty cannot
affect the denominator of this expression, this is equivalent to maximizing∑
v∈I P (r(v))piv(aI), as was to be shown.
On the other hand, if Beauty is a halfer (and a causal decision theorist), then
consider the standard Sleeping Beauty game, where a coin is tossed to determine
whether she awakens once (upon Heads) or twice, with all her three possible
awakenings in the same information set. Let her choose between Left and Right
upon each awakening. If the awakening is one corresponding to Heads, she will
receive 3 for choosing Left (and 0 for Right); if it is one corresponding to Tails,
she will receive 2 for choosing Right (and 0 for Left). If Beauty is a halfer (and
a causal decision theorist), upon awakening she will think it equally likely that
she is in a Heads awakening and that she is in a Tails awakening, and therefore
will choose Left for an expected payoff of 3/2 in this round (rather than Right
for 1). However, overall, choosing Right every time gives an ex ante expected
total payout of (1/2) · 2 · 2 = 2, whereas choosing Left every time gives an ex
ante expected total payout of (1/2) ·1 ·3 = 3/2, so Beauty fails to maximize her
expected payout. 
Intuitively, the way the proof works is as follows. Because the game is additive,
we can separate Beauty’s total ex ante expected payoff into the contributions
made to it by individual information sets I. It then remains to show that Beauty
maximizes her expected payoff for each information set I if she is a thirder and
a causal decision theorist. Now, the contribution of each individual awakening
event v within the information set I to the expected payoff is proportional to
the probability P (r(v)) of the coin toss realization r(v) that gives rise to v. But,
when she is in I, Beauty’s credence P (v|I) in v is also proportional to P (r(v)).
This is so because (being a thirder) her credence P (r(v)|I) in r(v) is proportional
to P (r(v))ν(I, r(v)), where ν(I, r(v)) is the number of awakening events in I,
across which this credence is equally divided. Because of this, Beauty weighs
the awakening events in an information set exactly so as to maximize ex ante
expected payoff. In contrast, if she is a halfer and a causal decision theorist, then
her credence in r(v) is not proportional to P (r(v))ν(I, r(v)) but rather just to
P (r(v)), so that her credence in v itself is proportional to P (r(v))/ν(I, r(v)).10
As a result, she places too little weight on awakening events v in I that cor-
respond to coin toss outcomes r that lead to many other awakening events in
9To see this, note that the first summation sums over all v by first summing over all r
and then over all v corresponding to that r. The second summation also sums over all v, but
instead by first summing over all information sets and then over all v in that information set.
In both cases, the summand for v is P (r(v))piv(aI(v)).
10At least, it would appear natural to split the credence equally across these ν(I, r(v))
awakening events—but note that the counterexample does not actually rely on this.
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I. This is what leads her to decide suboptimally in the counterexample at the
end of the proof: she insufficiently weighs the Tails awakenings in making her
decision.11
Proposition 1 also implies that Beauty, if she is a thirder and a causal deci-
sion theorist, is invulnerable to certain types of Dutch books. (This is already
discussed in prior work [Hitchcock, 2004, Draper and Pust, 2008, Briggs, 2010].)
Specifically, she will not fall for a Dutch book as long as: (a) Beauty, at the
beginning of the experiment, is made aware of the bets she will be offered in
different awakening states and will not forget this; (b) Beauty’s betting actions
affect neither her future awakening states nor the outcomes of past or future
bets; (c) for every two states in the same information set, the bet posed to
Beauty is the same. Here, (c) seems natural, because if two states in the same
information set were to have different bets associated with them, then in fact,
by (a), they would allow Beauty to distinguish between them before she takes
her action, contradicting that they are in the same information set. (a) and (c)
together ensure that we can interpret the bets as Beauty playing a game (whose
11One may wonder whether, along the lines of Briggs [2010], the halfer could correct for this
by adopting evidential decision theory instead. The idea would be that her decision provides
evidence for what she does in all the ν(I, r(v)) awakenings, thereby undoing the problematic
division by ν(I, r(v)) above. Unfortunately, if she adopts evidential decision theory, then in
general her decision will also provide evidence about what she does in other information sets
(especially, very similar ones) and this prevents the proof from going through. To illustrate,
consider the following example (an additive game). We toss a three-sided coin (Heads, Tails,
and Edge with probability 1/3 each). On Heads, Beauty will be awakened once in information
set I1; on Tails, once in information set I2; on Edge, once in I1 and once in I2. On every
awakening, Beauty must choose Left or Right. If the world is Heads or Tails, Left pays out
3 and Right 0; if it’s Edge, Left pays out 0 and Right 2. Note that I1 and I2 are completely
symmetric. The optimal thing to do from the perspective of ex ante expected payout is to
always play Left (and get (2/3) · 3 rather than (1/3) · 2 · 2 from Right). What will the EDT
halfer do? Upon awakening in (say) I1, she will assign credence 1/2 to each of Heads and
Edge (and 0 to Tails). (In fact, some variants of halfing will result in different credences;
to address such a variant, we can modify the example by adding another awakening in both
Heads and Tails—but not Edge—worlds, in an information set I3 where no action is taken.
All variants of halfing—and, for that matter, thirding—of which I am aware will result in
the desired credences of 1/2 Heads, 1/2 Edge in this modified example.) Now, the key point
is that if she plays Right (Left) now, this is very strong evidence that she would play Right
(Left) in I2 as well—after all the situation is entirely symmetric. Thus, conditional on playing
Left, she will expect to get 3 in the Heads world and 0 in the Edge world; conditional on
playing Right, she will expect to get 0 in the Heads world and 2 · 2 = 4 in the Edge world.
Hence she will choose Right (and by symmetry she will also choose Right in I2), which does
not maximize ex ante expected payout. Conitzer [2015] provides a more elaborate example
along these lines in the form of a Dutch book to which evidential decision theorists fall prey,
along with further discussion. (Incidentally, an evidential decision theorist who is a thirder
fails to maximize ex ante expected payoff on a much simpler example: in the counterexample
at the end of the proof of Proposition 1, just change the payoff for choosing Left on Heads to
5. Now Left maximizes ex ante expected payoff, but an evidential decision theorist who is a
thirder will calculate (1/3) · 5 = 5/3 < 8/3 = (2/3) · 2 · 2 and choose Right. What goes wrong
is that ν(I,Tails) = 2 now occurs twice on the right-hand side, once due to thirding (2/3) and
once due to evidential decision theory (the second 2; the third 2 is the payoff for choosing
Right on Tails). I thank an anonymous reviewer for providing this counterexample. It should
also be noted that Briggs [2010] already gives a Dutch book for an evidential decision theorist
who is a thirder.)
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rules she knows), and adding (b) ensures that this game is additive. (Note that
we may have to add an initial round to correspond to a bet at the beginning of
the experiment.) By the first part of Proposition 1, Beauty will act in a way
that maximizes her expected payout. This means she cannot be vulnerable to
accepting a set of bets that results in a sure loss, because if she did so she would
not be maximizing her expected payout (since, after all, she can also accept
none of the bets at all and thereby avoid a loss). Given all this, the second part
of Proposition 1 is unsurprising in light of the Dutch book given by Hitchcock
[2004] for halfers that use causal decision theory.
One may wonder whether additive games are really the “right” class of games
to which to restrict our attention. Perhaps the result can be generalized to a
somewhat broader class of games, for example by slightly relaxing the first con-
dition in Definition 2.12 Such a generalization, of course, would only strengthen
the point. More problematically, perhaps a different natural class of games
would actually favor halfing. I cannot rule out this possibility, but it seems
unlikely to me that such a class would be more compelling than that of additive
games. I believe that additive games are well motivated by the discussion given
at the beginning of this section about removing the coordination problem be-
tween Beauty’s multiple selves, and the fact that the result provides a corollary
about Dutch books is also encouraging.
5 Conclusion
What can we conclude from the foregoing? First and foremost, the Three Awak-
enings game shows that we should be very cautious when drawing conclusions
about halfing vs. thirding from the outcomes of decision-theoretic variants of
the Sleeping Beauty problem. I do believe that Proposition 1 shows some merit
to being a thirder rather than a halfer, but surely it does not settle the matter
once and for all. One might well argue, for example, that, once she has awak-
ened under particular circumstances, Beauty should no longer care whether she
maximizes her ex ante expected payout; instead, she should maximize her ex-
pected payout with respect to her beliefs at hand. These two objectives turn
out to be aligned in the case of a (causal decision theorist) thirder in addi-
tive games, and this may be a nice property. But the battle-hardened halfer is
likely more comfortable biting the bullet and accepting nonalignment in these
two objectives than giving up on other cherished philosophical commitments.
Another possibility for the halfer may be to embrace a version of evidential de-
12It should be noted that doing so appears nontrivial. For example, suppose we continue
to insist that the number of awakenings depends only on the outcome of the coin toss, but
we attempt to relax the requirement that actions do not affect the information that Beauty
has in future awakenings. Then, an action’s value may come less from the payoff resulting
directly from it and more from allowing Beauty to obtain increased payoffs in later rounds
by improving her information. It is possible that these latter, indirect effects on payoffs are
not additive even when the direct payoffs are additive (so that payoff additivity is technically
satisfied), and that this would still allow us to embed problematic examples such as the Three
Awakenings game.
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cision theory instead. More discussion of how halfers may or may not benefit
from adopting evidential decision theory, particularly in the context of Dutch
book arguments, is given by Arntzenius [2002], Draper and Pust [2008], Briggs
[2010], and Conitzer [2015] (see also the discussion in Footnote 11).
How could we create decision variants of the Sleeping Beauty problem that
leave no ambiguity about whether rational decisions truly correspond to rational
beliefs? One way to do so would be to consider a myopic Beauty. Such a Beauty
would be rewarded immediately after taking an action in the game, rather than
at the end. We may suppose that she is rewarded in something giving immediate
satisfaction—say, chocolate—rather than money. Moreover, she is assumed to
care only about the very near future; tomorrow is too far in the future to
affect her decisions. Her being myopic is not to be understood as her being
irrational. We still assume her to be entirely rational, but she just discounts the
future exceptionally heavily (and, to the extent it matters, the past as well).
Such a Beauty, in a simple variant (without decisions) where she is certainly
woken up on both Monday and Tuesday but given chocolate only on Tuesday,
will hope that today is Tuesday when she is awoken.13 So a myopic Beauty’s
preferences are entirely de se and de nunc. If we additionally suppose that
the game is additive as described above, then she need not worry at all about
what she will do or has done in other rounds (including about what her current
actions say about what she will do or has done in other rounds), because none
of those affect her current circumstances and rewards. Hence, it seems that
here beliefs and actions should unambiguously line up. Unfortunately, such
extreme assumptions also make it difficult, and perhaps impossible, to set up
an example that provides much insight beyond non-decision-theoretic variants
of the Sleeping Beauty problem. There is a tightrope to be walked here. Too
permissive a setup will allow us to reach conclusions that are unwarranted; too
restricted a setup will not allow us to reach any conclusions at all. Perhaps the
best we can hope for is to identify the happy medium and gradually accumulate
bits of evidence that, while each not entirely convincing on its own, gradually
tilt the balance in favor of one or the other position.14
13Perhaps such examples are more palatable when we consider variants of the Sleeping
Beauty problem that involve clones—see, e.g., Elga [2004] and Schwarz [2014]. The example
where she hopes that today is Tuesday then is analogous to the “After the Train Crash” case
in Hare [2007], where a victim of a train crash who has forgotten his name, upon learning
that the victim named “A” will have to undergo painful surgery, hopes that he is victim “B”.
(See also Hare [2009, 2010].)
14Not all of these bits of evidence would concern decision variants, especially as surprising
connections from the Sleeping Beauty problem to other problems continue to be drawn. For
example, Pittard [2015] makes an interesting connection to epistemic implications of disagree-
ment that provides a challenge to halfers (and argues that this challenge can be met). Of
course, there are also many direct probabilistic arguments. Many of these were already made
early on in the debate about Sleeping Beauty [Elga, 2000, Lewis, 2001, Arntzenius, 2002, Dorr,
2002, etc.], but new ones continue to be made [Titelbaum, 2012, Conitzer, 2014, e.g.].
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